We also show that politicians with office seeking ambitions are more affectively polarized, potentially explaining why top politicians - those who citizens often take affective cues from - may hold especially high levels of partisan animosity. More on implications in the paper!
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We find remarkable variation in politicians' affective polarization, with non-partisan politicians being -less- polarized than citizens, but document higher levels among partisan politicians and extreme ideologues. /2
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Now in Political Psychology: Why are some politicians more hostile than others? Do politicians as a group feel more partisan animosity than citizens? @lucasjacklucas and I report results from a study of 850 politicians and 28,500 citizens to provide first answers: /1
doi.org/10.1111/pops.12974
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Reposted by Lior Sheffer
Excited to share my new publication in the International Journal of Press/Politics with my brilliant friends Yossi David, @noamgidron.bsky.social & @liorsheffer.bsky.social! Imagined audiences have been studied for decades - but what do we know about imagined journalists? >>
shorturl.at/klovF
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This paper is the first contribution in what we argue should be a new, comparative research agenda on the causes and consequences of politicians' democratic theories. We are definitely working on that! Much more in the paper: doi.org/10.1111/1475...
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This is not merely an academic debate: these theories strongly predict politicians' in-office choices, such as how many hours per week they spend on different representational tasks. They also have other potential implications that we discuss. /4
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they believe that voters are driven by identity over policy, are unfair evaluators of politicians, and are past- rather than future-oriented. Only about 10% of politicians ascribe to 'folk theory' of democracy that sees voters as capable decision makers. /3
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Responding to this gap, Jack Lucas, Peter Loewen and I studied over 2,000 American and Canadian politicians to identify and classify their beliefs on voters. We find that a full 30% of Canadian politicians and nearly half of Americans ascribe to a "democratic realist" view: /2
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Now in @EJPRjournal: Are Politicians Democratic Realists? Social scientists debate whether citizens are competent participants in the political game, but where politicians stand on this question is far more consequential, and yet we know virtually nothing about their views. /1
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What's the bottom line? Coalition governments can redefine the fault lines of partisan hostility, but they do not appear to help drain the continuously filling pool of negative affect in some countries. Much more in the paper.
ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10....
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We find a symmetric spike in hatred towards the same coalition parties by Netanyahu supporters who found themselves out of power, likely foreshadowing the mobilization that returned him to power in 2022. /3
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We show that once coalition voters found out who they were co-governing with, they immediately began expressing warmer feelings towards those parties, quickly erasing what was until then seen as deep-rooted, ideological dislike. But we also document an offsetting trend: /2
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Now in EJPR: Can elections reduce partisan hostility? @noamgidron.bsky.social and I tracked 1,000 voters throughout the 2021 election in Israel, in which Netanyahu was temporarily ousted by a short-lived, improbable coalition whose member parties were highly hostile to each other. /1
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Reposted by Lior Sheffer
Check out this great special issue on comparative affective polarization -- including my paper with @liorsheffer.bsky.social and Guy Mor:
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
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If you want to read more about the context of Israel’s democratic crisis, Noam Gidron's recent paper in Journal of Democracy details the background behind the judicial overhaul and situates it within comparative debates over democratic backsliding.
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We find that attachment to Netanyahu and affective polarization strongly predict support for the judicial overhaul among coalition voters. Majoritarianism and entanglements with the legal system more weakly predict support, which is in turn not associated with populist attitudes.
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We use panel data collected before and after the announcement of the judicial overhaul to test the explanatory power of these accounts. These data, which extend the Israel Polarization Panel, allow us to overcome concerns of reverse causality.
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We identify 5 theoretical accounts regarding the underpinnings of public support for democratic backsliding, both in Israel and abroad: personalistic leadership, affective polarization, populism, majoritarianism and entanglement with the law.
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Earlier this year, Netanyahu’s government announced its plan to curtail the courts. Support for the plan is concentrated among coalition voters, but only two thirds of Likud voters-Netanyahu’s party-support the plan. What explains variations in support for democratic backsliding?
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Israel's democratic crisis provides us with an opportunity to explore, in real time, who supports democratic backsliding. Our new working paper (w\ Noam Gidron, Yotam Margalit and Itamar Yakir) examines this issue using original pre- and post-reform panel data. Here's what we find:
osf.io/zxukm/
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