Reposted by David Froomkin
i think the best way to understand the supreme court's conduct in trump v. united states is as an explicit effort to intervene in the 2024 election on behalf of the former president. it is a gross abuse of power on par with dred scott and deserves to be met with sanction from the elected branches.
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Interesting - I certainly see how Doubt may invite a History Boys reading (two plays from the same year!). But one of the things I find most interesting is how Shanley’s text tempts us to rush to judgment even as we know there is no proof—which I think illustrates the real theological/social point.
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Another shocking example of the normalization of criminality among American elites. Apparently members of the White House press corps habitually—and "proudly"—steal objects from Air Force One.
www.politico.com/newsletters/...
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So many of the country's problems would be solved by expanding the House of Representatives. Not only would it fix the malapportionment of the House, it would reduce the Senate's distortion of the Electoral College.
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True that presidential participation would be necessary for legislation, but I don't think that avoids the contradiction. And yes, the presumption is definitely that provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are self-executing!
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There have been other Roberts Court decisions with worse consequences, but in some ways Trump v. Anderson has done the most to make me doubt the plausibility of our most basic understanding of what courts do.
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I haven't looked into it (though I would be surprised), but other scholars have observed that it is very hard to reconcile Trump v. Anderson with originalism. See originalismblog.typepad.com/the-original... and reason.com/volokh/2024/....
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The NY Daily News oddly suggested that Father Flynn’s guilt is clear here—which is not only inimical to the spirit of the play but a baffling response to Schreiber’s moving and humane performance. “Doubt” has layers, but it is not a story about the righteousness of prosecution.
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I saw the excellent Broadway revival of “Doubt” the other day, and I’m glad to see it has generally received critical acclaim. Liev Schreiber and Amy Ryan’s performances are less explosive than those in the film but in many ways more vivid and compelling for the restraint.
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Let Biden be Biden
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Federalism for me but not for thee.
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Yeah, the excising of the militia portion of the Second Amendment seems like a good example. But the holding that the Second Amendment confers an individual right could still be consistent with that language.
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Setting aside whether Chiafolo reached the right result, it's not clear to me that it contradicted constitutional text in the same way. Seems like it permitted something in the interstices of the constitutional rules.
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And the problem here isn't just surplusage (like how the UET renders the Opinion Clause surplusage) but flat-out contradiction.
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There are definitely cases of the Court interpreting language in non-obvious ways, Hans and progeny, Bolling v. Sharpe, etc. But they typically (1) acknowledge it, (2) appeal to other principles (like structure) to justify it, and (3) preserve some meaning for the text rather than just excising it.
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Trump v. Anderson seems straightforwardly to excise the 2/3 rule from Section 3. Are there other cases of the Court so blatantly ignoring constitutional text? I can think of examples of twisting language (e.g. Hans v. Louisiana) and of cabining language (Slaughterhouse Cases), but not this.
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(1) Congress can (only) remove the Sec. 3 disability by 2/3 vote.
(2) Imposition of the Sec. 3 disability requires Congress to pass a statute.
(3) Congress can overturn a statute by majority vote -- thus removing the Sec. 3 disability.
The Court says (2). Then contradiction between (1) and (3).
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I used to think that courts at least had to apply the most precise constitutional requirements as written. But the majority seems pretty comfortable with taking a red pen to the Constitution.
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Is there any coherent theory of why Section 1 is self-executing while Section 3 is not? Not that the majority bothered to provide one....
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It is honestly amazing that the Court has the chutzpah now to rely on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Is there a critique of Mancur Olson implicit here? It seems like redistributive rather than predistributive policies economize on collective action effort. People just have to vote, and the mechanism of redistribution is highly centralized. But maybe Olson's motivational assumptions are wrong.
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Interesting research (lpeproject.org/blog/the-pol...) providing some confirmation for @himself.bsky.social's classic criticism of "left neoliberalism" (crookedtimber.org/2011/07/19/2...).
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My article on the legal dimensions of Senate reform has just been published in the Utah Law Review: dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2024/.... My father and I coauthored this piece as a pandemic project, and it means a lot to me to see it in print. I hope it stimulates more creative thought about solutions.
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Reposted by David Froomkin
New paper (w/ Ed Fox): The super-rich borrow against their big stock gains & consume from that, paying no tax. This is unfair. We show how to fix this and raise ~ $100 billion in a progressive, efficient way.
ssrn.com/abstract=471...
1/
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Such a wonderful feeling to see my first law review article appear in print today. I am enormously grateful to the editors at JREG. www.yalejreg.com/print/the-no...
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Very strange wording in the third paragraph of this article: "about two dozen trustees, more than half of the 48 voting members ..." Two dozen is not "more than half" of 48. And if it was 25, why use the evasive "about two dozen"? www.nytimes.com/2023/12/11/u...
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I had the opportunity to recommend this guide to a student today. It is a wonderful resource. Thanks, Amanda, for producing it!
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Such an important point. There is much less constitutional law on presidential power than we imagine.
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An important contribution to the debate over benefit-cost analysis, focusing on the shortcomings of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a criterion for evaluating government interventions -- and how it can be improved by "upweighting" poor people's interests. The corrected link: ssrn.com/abstract=458...
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The conservative legal movement has really embraced this. Their approach to administrative law seems to be 'make government less accountable, so it becomes scary.' Their approach to statutory interpretation seems to be 'make government less programmatic, so it becomes unappealing.'
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Reposted by David Froomkin
Your pet | what they're named after
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